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Preface 
The AERC Research Programme encompasses several types of research projects in 
order to suit the needs of the Programme, the researchers and the various themes 
they are investigating. One of these types is the Collaborative Research Project, 
which entails joint research by a team of African and non-African researchers 
coordinated by a senior African scholar on a mutually agreed theme. The collaborative 
approach is designed to produce a critical mass of high quality policy-oriented 
research. It is also an avenue for African scholars to exchange their experiences with 
counterparts elsewhere and to enhance skills. 
The subject of this special paper is a summary of a Collaborative Research Project 
on Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-S aharan Africa coordinated 
by Prof. T. Ademola Oyejide of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria (please see the 
annex for the complete list of contributors). The project yielded four volumes of 
material that are being published by Macmillan, London. The first volume is available 
from Macmillan and the remaining three volumes are due out in the coming year. 
This summary touches on the overall issues addressed, the findings and the 
recommendations. The material was also presented at a Dissemination Meeting for 
policy makers from sub-Saharan Africa held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1996 
sponsored by the UNECA and the AERC. A report of that meeting is also available 
upon request from AERC. 

1. Introduction 
This report describes the collaborative research project on Regional Integration and 
Trade Liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa, including an articulation of its key compo- 
nents and objectives. The report identifies and discusses the issues the project focused 
on, the major findings and results of the research, and the principal conclusions and 
their policy implications. The project was conceived and implemented in the context 
of the collaborative research modality of the African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC). As part of AERC's publication and dissemination efforts, moreover, each 
of the various research reports has been or will be published individually, while the 
overall components are being issued in a four-volume series by MacMillan Publishers, 
London (see Annex). The formal launch of the project, at the May 1993 AERC 
workshop in Cape Town, followed several consultative meetings in various locations 
in and outside Africa. 
In addition to AERC, sponsers of the project are Ford Foundation, the European 
Union, United Nations Development Programme and the Government of The 
Netherlands. 
Collaborative framework 
The main objectives of the collaborative research modality, which have also been 
reflected in the Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization Project design and 
implementation, include the following: 
Within this collaborative framework, the project drew from the pool of researchers 
and resource persons in the networks of AERC and its collaborating partners. These 
partners include the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University; 
the Centre for Research on Economic Development and International Trade, 
University of Nottingham; Development Economics Research Centre, University 
of Warwick; and the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. The many 
individual researchers who participated are listed in the Annex. 
The collaborative framework for this project used joint and interacting teams of 
researchers and resource persons drawn from networks organized around several 
African and non-African institutions. In constructing the various research teams, 
African researchers were consciously paired with their international counterparts to 
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optimize their respective comparative advantages with particular reference to technical 
tools and access to and understanding of the African policy community. The 
interactions were further enriched through periodic meetings of all the players to 
present, discuss and exchange ideas on draft papers at various stages of the research 
process. These meetings were also attended by selected members of the policy 
community from Africa and beyond (particularly the multilateral and bilateral donor 
agencies with special interest in Africa) whose experience and expertise positively 
influenced both the design and implementation of the research project. 
The project comprised two major components. The first consists of a set of 
framework papers that set the stage for and guided subsequent parts of the project. 
The framework papers articulated the major research and policy issues, reviewed 
and assessed the existing knowledge base with regard to these issues, identified and 
developed appropriate research methodologies, and tentatively indicated some broad 
policy implications. 
The second component of the project used case studies as the vehicle for the 
empirical analyses of the issues articulated by the framework papers. This compo- 
nent has two distinct but closely interwoven parts; one contains case studies of a 
sample of countries and the other consists of regional case studies. 
The case study countries were carefully selected on the basis of criteria that reflect 
their geographical location, membership in a particular integration scheme, size and 
level of development. The ten countries are Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The regional case studies cover six regional Integration schemes: the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Communaute Economique de 
L'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) together with its successor, the Union Economique et 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA); the Union Douaniere et Economique de 
l'Afrique Central (UDEAC); the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (PTA), together with its new manifestation, the Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC), recently transformed into the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Also 
included in the regional case studies is an analysis of unrecorded cross-border trade 
and trade flows in sub-S aharan Africa. 
Highlights of findings 
Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric in favour of regional integration arrangements in 
Africa, in general, it is safe to say that these schemes have not been particularly 
successful. In fact, the studies indicate that the least significant stimulus for trade 
liberalization—improved trade is one of the major objectives of such schemes—is 
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membership in a regional integration arrangement. While it appears true that trade in 
the region is naturally low, and not only because factors work against it, the shape 
and implementation of most of the integration schemes studied actually constrain 
trade. 
Consensual decision-making arrangements, overlapping and often conflicting 
integration scheme memberships, lack of regional level monitoring of the 
implementation of decisions, unwillingness of governments to cede authority to the 
regional bodies, and subsequent lack of power by the regional secretariats to take 
initiatives have rendered the schemes impotent. The absence of effective compensation 
arrangements in many of the regional integration schemes has further hindered 
implementation of certain trade liberalization measures. 
In many cases the chosen integration instruments were virtually guaranteed to 
discourage rather than promote intra-regional trade. With respect to ECOWAS and 
the PTA/COMESA, non-compliance with or delayed implementation of agreed 
liberalization schedules obviously did not enhance intra-group trade expansion. The 
domestic policy stance in these countries has also been generally at variance with the 
ideals of regional integration. In CEAO, the key regional integration instrument is 
the regional cooperation tax (TCR), which contributes to the erosion of the 
international competitiveness of the integrated area. The common external tariff (CET) 
and the single tax (taxe unique or TU) put in place by UDEAC resulted in differential 
protection. SACU's key integration instrument is a revenue-sharing formula that has 
elicited grumblings from both the smaller members and the large South African 
economy. 
National level trade liberalization, however, shows more promise, as liberalized 
trade regimes in a number of the individual countries studied correspond with 
improved economic indicators. The most dominant among the stimuli for trade 
liberalization noted in the case studies are linked to conditions imposed by structural 
adjustment programmes. The other side of this is that some trade reforms lack 
credibility because they are observed to be donor-driven and thus subject to reversal 
upon the whim of the government. 
The reluctance of governments in some of the countries to refrain from using 
traditional trade policy instruments for addressing issues of macroeconomic 
incompatibility made policy reversals virtually unavoidable. Exchange rate 
adjustments appear crucial in this respect, as it is only with foreign exchange 
liberalization that the tariff structure becomes the principal source of protection. 
The studies indicate that liberalization should not be construed as complete lack 
of trade controls. Some degree of protection is necessary as part of the proactive 
measures aimed at encouraging the expansion of the region's manufacturing sector. 
The level of import protection should be moderate, strictly limited, time bound, and 
related to some clearly understood and measurable performance standard. Thus, the 
immediate focus of policy attention should be on encouraging exports, while leaving 
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major import liberalization attempts until later. A successful, sustainable import 
liberalization programme requires successful exports. 
The achievement and continuous maintenance of macroeconomic balance and 
stability are essential to successful trade liberalization. Lack of credibility of reforms 
is a major factor in the lukewarm performance of many liberalization attempts. African 
governments need to establish appropriate mechanisms for enforcing the policy 
restraint necessary for macroeconomic stability. Such an agency of restraint could 
take a number of forms, all of which require careful consideration and study before 
implementation: 
1. Each country could use the regional scheme as an agency of restraint; this 
would require considerable strengthening of the schemes, as at present the 
penalties they can impose for breaking an agreement are small. 
2. Credibility would be enhanced if tariff ceilings were "bound" under provisions 
of the GATT/WTO agreements, which can be used as an agency of restraint 
that would be effective against internal lobbying for policy reversals. African 
governments have not yet done so, having failed to take advantage of the 
opportunity offered by the Uruguay Round. 
3. African customs unions could be linked to the European Union in fully 
reciprocal free trade arrangements. Such arrangements would have to be 
carefully considered, as there could be implications of "recolonization" of 
Africa, and costs/benefits need comprehensive analysis. 
One picture does emerge: economies that are willing and able to participate in the 
global marketplace have been the most dynamic. Globalization offers important 
opportunities for accelerating economic growth all over the world. Countries and 
regions of the world that are unable or unwilling to integrate themselves into this 
emerging mainstream of the global economy might not benefit from the growth- 
enhancing features of globalization. In fact, the African experience suggests that 
inadequate integration into the world economy and consequent lack of growth have 
led to the region's marginalization in the world goods and capital markets. That is 
not to say that globalization is free of problems. It can generate potentially severe 
and world-wide macroeconomic turbulence. It does not necessarily offer the same 
potential opportunities to all countries and the costs may also be differentiated. 
However, the more open economies in these case studies grew faster than the closed 
ones, while structural change corresponding to a shift in reliance from primary 
production to manufacturing occurred faster in open economies than in the relatively 
more closed ones. 
In summary, while trade liberalization efforts in Africa do often show positive 
results, African regional integration schemes have not met expectations. They suffer 
from design and implementation problems, and their potential will not be realized 
until both of these problem areas are appropriately addressed. 
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The remainder of this report presents the details of the studies and their findings. 
Sections 2 and 3 define the problem on which the project was focused, articulating 
the scope, coverage and objectives of the project and analysing the theoretical 
relationships and empirical conjectures upon which the project was based. A review 
of experiences follows, with regional integration in Section 4 and then trade 
liberalization in Section 5. The final sections offer some ideas and suggestions for 
the way forward. Section 6 looks at issues and options regarding opening up and 
linking Africa together, while Section 7 does the same with regard to opening up and 
linking Africa with the world. 
It is well to note that the views expressed here and in the project publications do 
not necessarily reflect the official position of AERC, the funders of the project or the 
collaborating institutions. 
2. Project focus and objectives 
This project began with the recognition that after more than three decades of 
experimentation, Africa's romance with regional integration continues unabated. It 
seems, in fact, to have intensified since the early 1980s. To underpin this continued 
interest, the Lagos Plan of Action offered a grand design that envisioned an 
evolutionary build-up from smaller regional groups in the western, central, northern, 
eastern and southern parts of Africa that should culminate, eventually, in an African 
Economic Community. The plan for this pan-African regional integration scheme 
was agreed to by the Organization of African Unity in 1980; the treaty was signed in 
June 1991. 
Until recently, regional integration schemes in Africa developed largely as 
groupings of geographically contiguous countries, each of which operated primarily 
as a closed economy under the constraints of import-substitution industrialization 
strategies. Not surprisingly, perhaps, these regional integration efforts have generally 
achieved little success. In particular, there was limited recorded intra-group trade. 
Several studies have identified a number of factors that may account for this failure. 
Participating countries generally fail to carry out agreed undertakings to abolish or 
even reduce trade barriers, probably because these regional undertakings are 
inconsistent with national-level import substitution policies or because they generate 
fears of unacceptable losses of tariff revenues. It appears that while African political 
leaders and their constituencies recognize the possible benefits that integration may 
bring, inaction is not necessarily viewed as an obstacle to progress in this matter. In 
general, the trade structures of participating countries are dominated by primary 
commodities and, hence, these countries are not necessarily each other's best trading 
partners. Finally, all the regional groupings have faced difficult distributional (gains 
and losses) questions for which no workable and mutually satisfactory compensation 
schemes could be designed. 
The adoption of World Bank assisted structural adjustment programmes (SAP) 
by the large majority of African countries from the early l980s is gradually leading 
to marked policy shifts away from predominantly import-substitution strategies and 
toward more open trade regimes. However, the SAPs and the trade liberalization 
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policies embedded in them were apparently designed and are being implemented 
without reference to the existing regional integration arrangements. It is thus not 
clear that the trade liberalization policies formulated by individual African countries 
are consistent with the undertakings these countries have entered into in the context 
of the integration schemes to which they belong. It is abundantly clear, however, that 
the continuing political rhetoric of African leaders regarding the issue of regional 
integration is profoundly out of step with the actual policy steps being taken at the 
level of individual countries. 
This state of affairs raises a number of questions. What, for instance, is driving 
current regional integration discussions and efforts in Africa given the dismal 
experience over the last three decades? Is it to attract donor sympathy and funds? Is 
it because other parts of the world (notably Europe and North America) are building 
trading blocs? Or it is because the ongoing political opening-up sweeping across 
Africa combined with the SAP-induced trade liberalization is expected to provide a 
more conducive environment for a more successful regional integration effort? 
Several other relevant questions are worth asking. How would regional integration 
under restructured economies differ from integration under protective structures? 
Would changes in trade barriers and outward orientation have significant implications 
for regional integration efforts? In principle, increased outward orientation may be 
expected to make countries more willing to implement agreed trade barrier reduction 
policies in the context of regional integration; the resulting trade liberalization may, 
in turn, directly boost actual intra-group trade, assist in changing trade structures and 
thus also boost potential intra-group trade. In this context, it becomes important to 
explore the analytical and policy implications of replacing a set of closed national 
economies with a closed regional economy. 
Trade liberalization is at the heart of the structural adjustment and macroeconomic 
policy reforms embraced by most African countries since the early 1980s. Yet it has 
been relatively little studied, either on its own or, more importantly, in the context of 
existing regional integration efforts. In addition, little is sufficiently understood, in 
concrete terms, regarding the degree, instruments, sequencing and consequences of 
trade liberalization in African countries. Similarly, there is a lack of knowledge about 
the links between regional integration and trade liberalization, especially how and 
the extent to which SAP-induced trade liberalization hinders or enhances regional 
integration. 
This project attempts to satisfy the need for a comprehensive study that would 
apply new perspectives and approaches, in terms of analytical framework and 
methodology, to the analysis of Africa's regional integration schemes and trade 
liberalization efforts, as well as the links between them. The focus and objectives are 
not limited to questions directed primarily at exploring Africa's past and current 
experience with regional integration and trade liberalization, important as these no 
doubt are. The project is also forward looking in the sense that it seeks to identify and 
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evaluate Africa's menu of future policy options regarding regional integration and 
trade liberalization. There is particular concern in the project for whether and the 
extent to which integration and liberalization processes could constitute viable 
mechanisms for opening up Africa, linking the continent together and linking it with 
the rest of the world as a means of enhancing sustainable growth and development. 
Against the background of the general objectives, key issues and questions 
described above, the case study component of the project explores a number of more 
specific and empirical questions. Since there are two types of case studies and the 
issues they address are different, it is sensible to treat them separately and sequentially. 
The regional focus 
The project uses the case studies of African regional integration experience as a 
vehicle for posing and answering four key questions: 
• What has been the performance of African regional integration schemes given 
their objectives, targets, main obstacles and constraints? 
• What are the implications of changing economic and political conditions for 
regional integration in Africa? 
• What is the impact of the global environment on African regional integration? 
• What are the special issues of significance for particular regional integration 
schemes in Africa and how have they influenced the schemes to which they 
relate? 
The first question seeks a firmer and more comprehensive understanding of African 
regional integration experience. This way of posing the question subsumes several 
important dimensions. Among these is the need to recognize and analyse the initial 
conditions such as potentials for market integration and the complementarity of 
production and trade structure of member countries that can be expected to affect 
eventual performance of regional integration schemes. Similarly, constraints to 
performance, such as existing barriers to trade and factor mobility between member 
countries, could have impacts that vary over different integration arrangements. 
Finally, implementation modalities and institutional designs often have significant 
implications for resolving distributional conflicts and managing compensation 
arrangements, which, in turn, could influence overall performance of regional 
integration schemes. 
African political and economic policy landscapes have clearly undergone marked 
changes, particularly since the early 1980s. On the economic policy front, various 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SUMMARY REPORT 11 
policy reforms have addressed issues of macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
adjustment, which include unilateral trade and financial liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation, and investment facilitation. These changing economic conditions 
influence intra-group trade and overall investment flows both across the various 
regional integration schemes and continent wide. Changes in the political arena that 
move in the direction of more transparent governance, democratization and greater 
participation in the political process can also be expected to enhance the growth of 
trade both within specific integrated areas and overall. 
Changes in the global environment, particularly those that define the "rules of the 
game" under which trade and investment relations between countries are managed, 
have important implications for regional integration and trade liberalization in Africa. 
In particular, the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) impinge upon the 
incentives for switching between regional and multilateral approaches to trade 
liberalization. Global liberalization under the auspices of the WTO would clearly 
affect regional integration through its impact on the margin of preferential tariffs that 
can be bargained among members of particular regional integration schemes. 
Under the fourth question, the project seeks to explore how and the extent to 
which peculiar design features or orientations of certain regional African integration 
schemes may have influenced their performance. One example of a peculiar design 
feature of particular relevance is the role of France as "external anchor" for both 
CEAO and UEMOA; in the case of SADCC, confrontation against apartheid South 
Africa provided a special orientation and donor support that probably influenced the 
organization's performance. 
The country focus 
Just as the project uses its regional case studies to explore a number of issues, it also 
uses the country specific case studies of trade liberalization experience to answer 
several questions, including the following: 
• Has trade liberalization taken place? 
• Are there linkages between particular episodes of trade liberalization and 
regional integration? 
• Are specific trade liberalization episodes credible or not? 
• What are the short-run and long-run consequences of particular trade 
liberalization episodes? 
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In answering the first question, the project defines trade liberalization in terms of 
several objective and quantifiable indicators such as changes in policies and observed 
changes in prices and quantities. These measures are then analysed to determine 
whether or not trade liberalization took place and, if so, when and over what period 
of time. In addition, the analysis of policy changes associated with price and quantity 
indicators of trade liberalization helps identify the main features of each episode of 
trade liberalization. The second question relates to linkages between regional 
integration and trade liberalization. It seeks to unravel two puzzles. 
One is whether specific trade liberalization episodes occurred unilaterally or in 
the context of liberalization schedules negotiated and agreed upon between partners 
in a regional integration arrangement. The other is the extent to which commitments 
made by countries within their regional integration schemes are consistent with the 
trade liberalization decisions they make individually at the national level. In other 
words, this question seeks to determine whether regional integration and country 
level trade policy enhance or hinder each other. 
The third issue relates to the credibility of particular trade liberalization episodes, 
which has been questioned in many African countries. This stems from a history of 
policy reversals implying specific unsustainable policy initiatives or incompatibility 
with other policies or developments in the economy. In assessing the credibility of 
each trade liberalization attempt this project develops and uses a series of diagnostics 
not only to determine credibility but also to indicate the proximate causes of credibility 
failure, when it occurs. 
If trade liberalization episodes are credible and sufficiently durable private 
economic agents may be expected to react appropriately, and one may expect to see 
some short-run and long-run consequences. This is the set of issues that the fourth 
question of the country case studies of trade liberalization is intended to explore. In 
answering this question, each country case study analyses time series of output, 
employment and investment as well as the growth and composition of external trade 
as a means of measuring the short-run and long-run impacts of trade liberalization. 
3. Background 
Promotion of regional trade is an important objective of most of the regional integration 
schemes in Africa. However, trade expansion is not necessarily desired for its own 
sake but rather as a means to an end. In particular, accelerated development through 
increased regional trade has clearly been central to the vision of regional integration 
in Africa. 
It is important, therefore, to explore the linkages and mechanisms through which 
regional integration is expected to bring about both an expansion of intra-regional 
trade and accelerated development of the integrated area essentially by liberalizing 
trade within the region. 
Up to the early 1980s, most African countries tried to accelerate their economic 
growth on the basis of an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) development 
strategy. From the economic perspective, the small size of the typical African economy 
and the perceived disadvantages of smallness in the context of this strategy appear to 
be a key reason for the establishment of various regional integration schemes. In 
particular, a small population combined with low per capita income restrict the ability 
to benefit from lower unit costs arising from the exploitation of economies of scale 
and curtail allocative efficiency gains that could be generated by increased competition. 
Against this background, regional integration appears to be a logical way to enable 
an economy to produce at lower unit costs for a larger (regional) market. Regional 
integration is embraced primarily as a means of widening market size and thus 
realizing the benefits of greater specialization and economies of scale. In this sense, 
import substitution in the context of larger regional markets could generate greater 
competition within the region and induce higher levels of productivity overall than 
were possible within the narrow confines of individual national markets. Compared 
with global liberalization, regional integration could be regarded as a more viable 
source of the benefits of economies of scale because of the anticipated problems of 
market access and the presumed higher transaction costs of producing for the world 
market. 
The above notwithstanding, the arguments for regional integration do not lend 
themselves to unambiguous conclusions. At the static level and in the context of the 
simplest models, the desirability of an integration scheme depends on the balance of 
the opposing forces of trade creation and trade diversion. The case for regional 
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integration in the context of an export promotion strategy becomes stronger when 
dynamic factors are taken into account. However, whether this can be realized in 
practice depends on the extent to which economies of scale and international 
competitiveness are achieved, and on the feasibility of setting up a suitable 
compensation scheme, a key issue given the likelihood that effective regional 
integration could result in geographic concentration of certain economic activities 
(e.g., production facilities) within the integrated region. 
Insights from new economic geography suggest that the interplay of economies 
of scale and location-specific costs could provide a rationale for regional integration 
schemes in Africa. The basic idea is that location decisions of producers are based on 
considerations of internal economies of scale and "trade costs". Trade costs consist 
generally of transport and information costs (the latter include language and cultural 
barriers to ease of transactions). These costs increase with distance between the 
producer and the consumer. The inherited colonial pattern of production and trade 
between the typical African country and its European "mother" country combined 
with high trade costs between African countries has generated a "hub-and-spoke" 
trade pattern in which activities that have powerful scale economies, such as 
manufacturing, are located in the European "hub" from which they supply consumers 
located in numerous African "spokes". In this arrangement, no African country "spoke" 
has a sufficiently large market to warrant the location of manufacturing production 
facilities in it unless trade costs within Africa can be drastically reduced. 
A regional integration scheme that joins the spokes by reducing intra-African 
trade costs could radically alter the existing hub-and-spoke production and trade 
pattern and justify the location of production within the integrated region. The same 
location theory suggests, however, that if intra-regional trade costs are initially high, 
small reductions would tend to increase regional concentration of production. Clearly, 
this would generate greater inter-governmental conflict over compensation 
arrangements. Happily, though, the theory predicts that more sweeping and deeper 
liberalization measures that bring about large reductions in intra-regional trade costs 
might substantially counter the trend towards concentration of production. Thus, this 
analytical perspective not only provides a robust justification for regional integration 
in Africa, it also predicts that such a scheme would be more effective and less 
contentious if impediments to trade within the integrated region were quickly 
eliminated. 
The third source of insights for constructing an economic rationale for regional 
interaction in Africa is the "agency of restraint" paradigm. This starts from the 
observation that, in Africa, government policies are frequently reversed. These policy 
reversals create credibility problems: private economic agents are reluctant to make 
investment and production decisions for fear of losses that could result from the 
reversals. Governments, on their part, can reverse policies easily because they are 
not subject to agencies of restraint that are sufficiently powerful to impose penalties 
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severe enough to deter such behaviour. In this context, the purpose of regional 
integration would be to promote investment and thus enhance economic growth by 
helping to enforce the policy restraint necessary for macroeconomic stability. What 
is required here is a participatory, reciprocal and supranational agency of restraint 
that ties key national economic policies in a reciprocal threat-making arrangement. 
The agency would ensure that all participating countries commit to sound and stable 
policies and should be in a position to effectively threaten errant members with credible 
and costly sanctions. Such an organization would have clear advantages over the 
essentially alien, unidirectional and unreliable "conditionality" of donors and 
international financial institutions. 
In summary, analytical insights drawn from various theoretical perspectives suggest 
a number of propositions regarding regional integration and trade liberalization in 
Africa. First, some support and rationale can be found for regional integration in 
Africa. Second, however, one may have to look beyond the promotion of intra-regional 
trade as the key motivation for establishing regional integration. Third, regional trade 
is in any case unlikely to emerge as an important engine of African growth in the 
near term since African countries lack the income levels and structural 
complementarities that could generate large gains from regional specialization, 
whether within or across industries. Fourth, even if increased intra-African trade in 
the context of regional integration is viewed as intrinsically desirable, it may be best 
achieved as an automatic by-product of a more generalized rather than preferential 
reduction of trade barriers. Fifth, an African regional integration scheme motivated 
by the goal of avoiding the hub-and-spoke effects of inherited colonial production 
and trade patterns would be feasible and would be devoid of intense inter-governmental 
conflicts over compensation arrangements only if it is accompanied by rapid 
elimination of trade impediments in the integrating area that precludes geographical 
concentration of production facilities. Finally, perhaps the strongest argument for 
regional integration in Africa derives from the need to create a web of reciprocal 
deals and threats, supervised by a participatory supranational agency of restraint that 
increases the penalties for national-level policy reversal and so reduces its likelihood. 
4. Regional integration experience 
The analysis of the experience with regional integration in Africa is based on case 
studies of six regional integration arrangements. Two of these are CEAO/UEMOA 
and ECOWAS in West Africa; the Central African representative in the sample is 
UDEAC; and from eastern and southern Africa are SADC, PTAICOMESA and SACU. 
The case studies cover a set of common issues and questions intended to provide 
a comparative framework for the analysis. The analysis focuses on the establishment 
and evolution of each regional integration arrangement, bearing in mind its 
antecedents, subsequent treaty reforms and revisions, and any transformations that 
may have taken place in terms of name, objectives, mandate and membership. Next, 
the analysis describes and interprets each regional integration scheme's motivation 
and objectives with a view to pinpointing the set of objectives that is either shared by 
all such schemes or can, in some other way, be regarded as dominant. 
The third focus of the analysis relates to the broad characteristics of each regional 
integration arrangement. This covers the number of member states as well as the 
differences and similarities among them in terms of their economic and trade 
structures, their income levels, language, and colonial history. Next is a review of the 
institutions and instruments designed, established and used by each regional 
integration scheme as a means of achieving its objectives. Subsequently, the analysis 
examines each organization's main constraints as a prelude to a review of its 
performance. Following this is an attempt to more fully understand the implications 
for each regional integration scheme of the changing political and economic conditions 
in Africa since the mid 1980s, as well as the current and probable future impact of 
the global environment. Finally, the analysis reviews the relationship(s) between 
various regional integration schemes and the extent to which these relationships may 
enhance or hinder their performance. 
Establishment and evolution 
Several of the regional integration schemes have roots in much older colonial arrange- 
ments. Thus, although SACU was established in its present form only in 1969, it 
stems directly from the 1910 agreement between South Africa and the three British 
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High Commission Territories of Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now 
Botswana) and Swaziland. Similarly, while the treaty establishing UDEAC was signed 
in 1964, it was in reality an outgrowth of UDE, which was created in 1959, and the 
Preferential Trade Area established in 1961 between Cameroon and the UDE. 
In the case of West Africa, a similar story unfolds with respect to CEAO/UEMOA. 
CEAO was founded in 1973 on the basis of the cooperation experience gained through 
UMOA (the monetary union), created in 1962, and UDEAO, which was established 
in 1966. Part of the region currently covered by the PTA/COMESA, established in 
1982, had an earlier history of regional cooperation. It was preceded by the Kenya- 
Uganda customs union created in 1917 and joined by Tanganyika in 1927; the East 
African Community was established by these three countries in 1967. 
In essence, therefore, only ECOWAS (established in 1975) and SADCC/SADC 
(created in 1980) can be viewed as regional integration schemes emanating entirely 
from a post-independence African vision and without a colonial antecedent. A 
generous interpretation of this finding would probably include PTA/COMESA in 
this list, but three of the key members of this organization brought to the PTA a rich 
experience of previous cooperation, even if that experience was partially negative in 
the sense that the EAC collapsed almost a decade before the birth of the PTA. 
Many of these regional integration schemes have evolved from their original 
manifestations. For instance, CEAO was abolished when UEMOA was created in 
1994 as a vehicle for combining the market integration mandate of CEAO with the 
monetary integration focus of UMOA. Similarly, SADCC became SADC in 1992, 
while the PTA transformed itself into COMESA in 1993. UDEAC remains basically 
a market integration scheme that is paralleled on the monetary side by BEAC. It was 
expected to fold into the larger CEAC, which was established in 1983 in pursuance 
of the UNECA-LPA vision and grand design of regional integration in Africa. But 
CEAC has not become operational for lack of funding. Although its treaty was 
substantially revised in 1992, ECO WAS remains virtually unchanged since its estab- 
lishment. 
SACU also remains largely unchanged, although a vigorous renegotiation 
discussion has been going on since the early 1 980s. More definite movements have 
occurred on the monetary side, however. In particular, the formalization of monetary 
integration within the SACU area started in 1974 with an agreement between South 
Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland to create the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). In 1986, 
the RMA was transformed into the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and in 1992 
independent Namibia was admitted into the CMA. At this point SACU and CMA 
taken together represent a combination of customs union with monetary integration 
and convertible currencies. 
Measured in terms of degree of integration, it seems clear that CEAOIUEMOA 
and SACU/CMA, which combine market and monetary integration, are at the top of 
the ladder. It is also, perhaps, not an accident that both of these schemes have evolved 
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from colonial antecedents. But they do differ in certain important respects. SACU/ 
CMA is held together by a dominant partner, i.e., South Africa, while UEMOA is 
anchored by France. Thus, the UEMOA arrangement continues to reflect its colonial 
roots and may be viewed as a prelude to a full-fledged North-South scheme in the 
shape of NAFTA. 
Motivation and objectives 
Virtually all the regional integration schemes covered by this project express, as 
their primary motivation, the desire to assist in raising the standard of living of their 
population. Similarly, they all assume that the way to achieve this overriding objective 
is to promote greater cooperation and more balanced development of their member 
states. Compared to the others, SADCC initially had a more specific raison d 'ètre, 
i.e., to reduce the dependence of its member states on South Africa at a time when 
the latter's regime was politically unacceptable. The specific objectives of 
most of the regional integration schemes include the elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions on trade between members, establishment of a common external tariff 
against non-members, abolition of obstacles against the movement of persons, services 
and capital within the integrated area, and harmonization of economic policies among 
member states. Since they also favour balanced development of member states, most 
of the schemes include instruments for promoting the growth of the less developed 
members and for compensating particular member states where necessary. 
The schemes differ significantly with respect to their chosen instruments for dealing 
with the objective of balanced development and compensation. 
At least one scheme (SACU) relies solely or primarily on a revenue-sharing 
formula. A few others, such as PTAICOMESA and SADC, depend on regional projects 
and regional policies for promoting equitable and balanced development within the 
integrated area. A third set of regional integration schemes, which contains CEAO/ 
UEMOA, ECOWAS and UDEAC, combines an explicit compensation fund with the 
allocation of regional projects for the same purpose. In spite of the differences of 
opinion between South Africa and its partners in SACU, this scheme's compensation 
arrangement works better than those of other regional integration schemes in Africa. 
This may have something to do with the way the various compensation funds are 
financed. SACU has a fairly straightforward revenue sharing arrangement; what is 
shared according to an agreed formula is a pooled customs tariff revenue. Many of 
the other regional integration schemes have explicit compensation funds that are 
financed by contributions from members. They work less well primarily because the 
required contributions are often not paid when due. 
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Characteristics of integrating areas 
The initial conditions in some regional integration schemes were more conducive to 
higher intra-group trade flows than those in others. CEAOIUEMOA may be singled 
out in this respect. The seven countries constituting this scheme had some 
complementary structures; inter-sectoral division of labour was important in trade 
between Burkina Faso and Mali (agricultural exporters) and Côte d' Ivoire and Senegal 
(relatively industrialized members). Rail links exist between many of the member 
states; hence, natural barriers to trade such as prohibitive transport costs are lower 
than elsewhere in Africa. In addition, a high degree of factor mobility prevailed 
between CEAO countries, against the background of a common currency and French 
language. Finally, there exists the Conseil de l'Entente, which uses funds from donors 
and richer members to finance development projects in less developed countries; the 
need to retain access to these external funds promoted loyalty to CEAO. 
SACU exhibits some of these advantages as well. It is, however, a partnership 
between one relatively large economy and four tiny economies. South Africa accounts 
for 46% of SACU's geographic area, 87% of its population and 93% of its GDP, and 
has a significantly larger and more developed industrial sector than the other countries. 
SACU derives part of its resilience from the long history of significant intra-group 
trade. In more specific terms, most SACU imports are sourced from or through South 
Africa. The other members of SACU account for 25% of South Africa's manufactured 
exports and 10% of its total exports. This level of intra-group trade is, no doubt, 
facilitated by the relatively low transport costs within SACU, the high factor mobility, 
the existence of a common language and significant monetary integration. 
UDEAC, whose six members also belong to the franc zone, has the advantage of 
free capital mobility. But labour mobility is severely restricted and intra-group trade 
is limited. The original nine members of SADCC have broadly similar production 
and trade structures and, in addition, lack the advantages of good transport links and 
a common currency (or even convertible currencies). Its recent transformation into 
SADC and the addition of Namibia, South Africa and Mauritius as members should 
bring about greater complementarities in the economic structure. 
Compared to the smaller and more compact schemes referred to above, ECU WAS 
(with 16 members) and PTA/COMESA (with 22 members) lack many of the initial 
conditions regarded as conducive to effective regional integration. Both regional 
bodies exhibit immense discrepancies in market size, production and trade. The 
dominance of ECOWAS by Nigeria is not accompanied with the same economic 
linkages associated with South Africa's dominance of SACTJ (and probably of SADC 
also). Language, cultural differences and poor transportation and communication 
infrastructures that hinder intra-group trade in ECO WAS are probably just as potent 
in the case of PTA/COMESA. Unlike ECOWAS, however, PTA/COMESA visa 
requirements continue to severely restrict labour mobility. 
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Key integration instruments 
Significant regional integration instruments have been developed in only three of the 
six schemes examined in this project. These three are CEAOIUEMOA, UDEAC and 
SACU. In CEAO, the key regional integration instrument is the regional cooperation 
tax (TCR). This is a special preferential regime with two different objectives. First, it 
limits intra-regional competition by favouring products from poorer member states 
over those from more advanced countries. Second, it promotes regional import 
substitution through explicit discrimination against third-country sources. TCR 
replaces all duties and taxes levied on imports of member states and thus serves as a 
common external tariff. But it has an inherent defect. By helping to maintain inefficient 
industries in the poorer countries and protecting all regional products from outside 
competition, the TCR contributes to further erosion of the international 
competitiveness of the integrated area. 
Two key instruments were developed in UDEAC, the common external tariff 
(CET) and the single tax (taxe unique or TU). The CET replaced import duties on 
imports from outside the region. It included a complementary component meant to 
temporarily compensate member countries for lost revenue due to the harmonization 
of customs duties. Because of large initial divergences in individual rates, the 
complementary component of CET varied quite widely among countries; hence CET 
resulted in differential protection. 
The single tax (or TU) intended foster regional industrial production and trade by 
reducing domestic and import taxes on regional goods relative to extra-regional goods. 
In effect, the TU replaced all domestic indirect taxes and import duties for industrial 
goods produced and sold within UDEAC by registered firms. Although TU rates 
were significantly lower than the CET, the TU was a very discriminatory regime. TU 
rates varied from firm to firm, by product and by country primarily because each 
member country determined the rate that applied in its territory. 
SACU's key integration instrument is a revenue-sharing formula. All customs, 
excise and sales duties as well as import surcharges collected in the member states 
are pooled at the South African Reserve Bank. The formula provides the basis for 
calculating the amount due to the individual member states—Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland. Because these small countries are in a customs union with 
a more developed South Africa, the revenue-sharing formula serves as a mechanism 
to compensate for the negative impact of possible trade-diversion, the loss of fiscal 
sovereignty and the likely concentration of industrial development in these countries. 
Constraints 
Virtually all of the regional integration schemes suffer from one design defect or 
another. In many cases consensual decision-making arrangements, lack of regional 
level monitoring of the implementation of decisions and lack of power by the regional 
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secretariat to take initiatives have rendered the schemes impotent. In UDEAC, for 
instance, the treaty does not transfer sovereignty over any significant matters to the 
regional authority. As a result, regional integration in trade matters is held hostage by 
specific national interests. In monetary matters, however, the majority decision 
arrangement in the franc zone central bank keeps monetary integration on track. 
In both ECOWAS and PTAICOMESA, the domestic policy stance has been 
generally at variance with the ideals of regional integration. Recent reforms moving 
many African countries away from import-substitution policies and towards greater 
outward orientation may re-align domestic policies with requirements of regional 
integration. But the implementation of unilateral trade liberalization programmes, at 
different speeds and without regional coordination, implies that the undesirable policy 
variance may continue to be problematic. 
Given the relatively heavy dependence of many African countries on international 
trade taxes, the absence of effective compensation arrangements in many of the 
regional integration schemes has hindered implementation of certain trade 
liberalization measures at the regional level. In other cases, attempts to finance 
compensation funds from contributions have generally been less than satisfactory. 
In several key cases, overlapping memberships have created special problems. In 
West Africa, the rivalry between ECOWAS and CEAO/UEMOA renders both 
institutions less effective than they could be, partly due to lack of commitment resulting 
from divided loyalty. More significantly, however, there is a great conflict in the 
approaches of the two overlapping institutions. On the one hand, CEAO/UEMOA 
through its linkage with France could, in principle, develop into a North-South regional 
integration scheme if France were replaced by the European Union. On the other 
hand, ECOWAS views itself as the West African building block for the ultimate all- 
African regional integration scheme (AEC). This sharp difference in approach and 
ultimate destination has created tremendous tensions in both organizations. 
In the east and south of Africa, a similar rivalry has emerged—in this case between 
SADC and PTA/COMESA, another set of two institutions with overlapping 
memberships. Several scenarios appear to exist for resolving this issue. A merger 
between SADC and COMESA is, apparently, unacceptable to the former, which would 
rather dismember the latter into northern and southern halves, with the southern half 
being then equivalent to SADC. This last scenario would not only eliminate 
overlapping but would also free SADC to move, under the leadership of South Africa, 
into a North-South linkage with the European Union, thus replicating the dilemma in 
the west. 
Impact of changing conditions 
The changing political and economic conditions in Africa over the last decade or so 
and the changes occurring in the global environment have significant implications 
for the regional integration schemes in Africa. Some of these schemes have recently 
22 SPECIAL PAPER 28 
revised their treaties or in some other way altered their organizational forms and/or 
activities in response to some of these changes. The economic policy changes of the 
late 1980s, particularly those associated with structural adjustment, revealed 
discrepancies and distortions and pointed out the need to integrate the trade-promoting 
aspects of CEAO with the monetary harmonization mandate of UMOA. This resulted 
in UEMOA. The explicitly stated role of France as the guarantor of UEMOA and 
ongoing changes in the global environment could further transform UEMOA in a 
possible direct link with the European Union. 
In the context of ECOWAS and PTA/COMESA, what the changes associated 
with structural adjustment have brought about is a realization that unilateral trade 
liberalization and reduction in the extent of currency over-valuation can have a greater 
impact on intra-group trade expansion than all the regional protocols that have been 
signed. However, the uncoordinated nature of unilateral liberalization could mean 
that the full potential of these changes is not realized in the regional context. The 
lack of coordination at the regional level also implies that neither ECOWAS nor 
PTA/COMESA is in a position to monitor and enforce the commitment of member 
states to their liberalization policies and thus help to strengthen their credibility. 
Recent political changes in South Africa radically affected SADCC—transforming 
it into SADC. These changes rendered redundant SADCC's original reason for 
existing, i.e., to reduce dependence on South Africa. The new SADC has now 
welcomed Namibia, Mauritius and South Africa into its fold, and has also become 
much less inclined to associate with PTA/COMESA. Viewed from the perspectives 
of South Africa's recent offer to GATTIWTO and its ongoing negotiations with the 
European Commission, it may be that a South Africa-led SADC could establish a 
viable South-North link with the European Union, using a more direct route than that 
presumed in the French-anchored UEMOA. 
Performance 
The changes alluded to above are clearly too recent to have significantly affected the 
historical performance of African regional integration schemes. While they and their 
implications are clearly important, an evaluation of how and the extent to which they 
boost or hinder the performance of the various schemes cannot be carried out at this 
time. What is offered below, therefore, abstracts from the recent changes. 
The literature generally suggests, and the results of this project unanimously 
confirm, that the regional integration schemes in Africa have not significantly 
increased intra-regional trade. In most cases, results from studies based on gravity 
models suggest that African intra-group trade is not necessarily low because of factors 
that work differentially against it, but rather that it is naturally low. Analysis based 
on comparison of trade ratios over time also shows that in virtually all the integrating 
regions such ratios have actually declined or remained stagnant over time. 
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In particular cases, however, the findings of this project suggest specific factors 
that could help explain this general pattern. In the cases of both CEAO and UDEAC, 
it seems clear that the chosen integration instruments were virtually guaranteed to 
discourage rather than promote intra-regional trade. With respect to ECO WAS and 
the PTA/COMESA, non-compliance with or delayed implementation of agreed 
liberalization schedules obviously did not enhance intra-group trade expansion. 
It is by and large taken for granted that South Africa derives significant benefits 
from SACU. Clearly, in the absence of this customs union, some of South Africa's 
exports to its partners in SACU would face severe competition and be lost to suppliers 
from elsewhere, since South Africa is not necessarily the cheapest source for all the 
imports of its SACU partners. But for these partners also, it is clear that SACU 
membership has not prevented them from achieving impressive rates of economic 
growth or from successfully transforming the sectoral composition of their GDP. 
Furthermore, in terms of per capita income growth, each of these partners has improved 
its position relative to South Africa over the past 20 years. Membership in SACU 
and the duty-free access to the larger South African market that this guarantees has 
continued to be a major promotional point for the SACU member countries in 
attempting to attract foreign investment into their economies. Recent surveys of the 
private sector in these countries also confirm that SACU has been mutually beneficial. 
5. Trade liberalization experience 
The case study framework used in this project focuses on a set of common issues. In 
particular, questions were asked about whether trade liberalization took place. If it 
did, each case study then went further to determine when and over what period; it 
also examined the key features of each trade liberalization episode. In addition, the 
impetus for and the mechanisms of the various liberalization episodes were analysed. 
The credibility and sustainability of trade liberalization episodes constitute another 
major issue of concern addressed in the case studies. Finally, an analysis of the short- 
run and long-run consequences of the trade liberalization episodes was undertaken 
in each case study. 
Pre -liberalization trade regimes 
What were the dominant features of the restrictive trade regimes subjected to change 
in the liberalization episodes? An understanding of these should provide the 
background against which the impetus for reform as well as the pressures behind the 
frequent reversals of policy reform measures can be properly appreciated. 
Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, many African countries built up 
highly interventionist and protectionist trade regimes. These regimes were broadly 
characterized, on the import side, by restrictive licensing systems, high tariffs, 
escalated or cascading tariff structures made up of several layers, varying degrees of 
import prohibitions, and tight foreign exchange controls. On the export side, the 
trade regimes feature substantial implicit and explicit taxes as well as frequent use of 
non-tariff barriers, such as the prohibition of certain export items. These heavily 
protectionist trade regimes were motivated by several different concerns, some of 
which were conflicting. This probably accounts for the rather haphazard, incoherent 
and internally inconsistent nature of the trade regimes that eventually evolved. The 
implications for the pre-liberalization trade regimes are broadly reflected in the case 
studies covered by this project. 
One of the key problems trade policy had to address in most of the case study 
countries was government revenue. Given the heavy reliance on tariffs for revenue it 
is not surprising that fiscal concern was a major motive for imposing high import 
and, in some cases, export tariffs. At the same time, many of these countries were 
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highly susceptible to balance-of-payments pressures, given their strong commitments 
to the maintenance of often unrealistic fixed exchange rate systems. In this context, 
trade policy often became a substitute for more appropriate polices needed to maintain 
macroeconomic discipline (such as exchange rate and fiscal policies, for example). 
Hence, non-tariff import control measures were often applied whenever it became 
necessary to deal with recurring balance-of-payments crises. 
Some aspects of the pre-liberalization trade regimes could also be traced to the 
desire to protect domestic industries in the context of the import-substitution industri- 
alization (ISI) strategy popular in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Evidence to 
support this includes extensive exemptions from tariff duties and low tariff rates on 
imported inputs used by local producers. The generally escalated structure of tariffs 
that imposed high rates on finished products and much lower rates on raw materials 
provides additional evidence in this regard. 
It is important to bear in mind that high tariff rates were also applied to so-called 
"luxury" goods. These were import items thought to be consumed largely by the rich 
and were often goods for which no local production facility existed to be protected. 
Thus, high tariffs did not always reflect the desire to protect local industry; in certain 
cases they were aimed at raising revenue based on the perceived ability of certain 
categories of consumers to pay. The pre-liberalization trade regimes of many African 
countries exhibited a strong relationship between the use of import restrictions and 
the appearance of balance-of-payments problems. Balance-of-payments concerns, 
together with budgetary needs, probably had much stronger impact on the evolution 
and structure of pre-liberalization trade regimes in the case study countries than did 
the desire to protect local manufacturing activities. 
Impetus for trade liberalization 
This study shows that trade liberalization episodes in the case study countries have 
been brought about by various types of stimuli. A two-way classification of these 
stimuli helps identify unilateral and multilateral mechanisms. The unilateral 
liberalization attempts, in turn, consist of several categories. In some cases they derive 
from conditions imposed on the liberalizing countries for gaining access to external 
finance in exchange for policy reform in the context of structural adjustment 
programmes. In addition, some unilateral trade liberalization efforts have either been 
associated with positive external shocks that enabled some countries to finance their 
liberalization attempts or related to "own initiatives" that reflected internal policy 
dynamics and the design and use of innovative schemes to finance the liberalization 
process. 
The multilateral mechanism for trade liberalization in the case study countries 
refers, essentially, to those liberalization efforts that were designed and implemented 
in the context of specific regional integration schemes. This study offers a unique 
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opportunity to determine the existence of this trade liberalization mechanism, and to 
evaluate its significance and effectiveness particularly in relation to the experiences 
of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria within ECOWAS; those of Mauritius, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe within the PTA/COMESA; and that of 
South Africa within SACU. 
Among the four different types of stimuli for trade liberalization identified above, 
the most prevalent in the case study countries was the liberalization process embedded 
in the structural adjustment programmes. These programmes shaped the design, scope 
and sequence of trade liberalization processes in nine of the ten case study countries 
since the mid 1980s; the single exception is South Africa. Five of the nine countries, 
i.e., Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, experienced 
partial reversals of their trade liberalization processes. Nigeria partially reversed in 
1988 and virtually abandoned its process in 1994. Only Ghana and Mauritius appear 
to have pursued their programmes persistently. 
Positive external shocks stimulated some trade liberalization episodes in several 
case study countries. Liberalization episodes associated with this stimulus were 
typically temporary and partial, usually characterized by temporary and limited 
relaxation of import restrictions and exchange controls. In the cases of Kenya and 
Tanzania this type of liberalization occurred in response to the commodity booms of 
1976/77. The episodes were short-lived; the collapse of 1979/80 generated policy 
reversals and brought in even more severe import restrictions and exchange controls 
than before. The Nigerian trade liberalization episode of 1970-1976 had a similar 
origin in the positive external shock generated by the oil export boom, and it suffered 
a similar fate as soon as the external shock was reversed. 
Several varieties of the "own initiative" stimulus for trade liberalization explain a 
number of trade liberalization episodes in some of the case study countries. In South 
Africa, internal policy discussions led, in 1972, to initiatives that focused on the 
reduction of the anti-export bias inherent in the existing ISI development strategy. 
Subsequent policy reviews between 1983 and 1993 led to a new industrial strategy 
featuring a more neutral trade regime with tariffication of quantitative restrictions 
and a simpler, more transparent tariff structure. 
Mauritius began reducing the anti-export bias inherent in its ISI strategy between 
1970 and 1979, largely as a prelude to more comprehensive trade liberalization 
associated with its structural adjustment programme in the early 1980s. Compared 
with several of the case study countries that made a similar attempt, the sheer scale 
and effectiveness of the effort in Mauritius set it apart from the others. 
Another variety of "own initiative" stimulus for trade liberalization is based on 
the Own Funded Import Schemes. Under these schemes, importers were allowed to 
bring in goods without official foreign exchange allocation to finance such imports 
and with no questions asked about the source of financing. The schemes were aimed 
essentially at ameliorating generalized shortages of essential goods and controlling 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SUMMARY REPORT 27 
inflation. These schemes were used to support some trade liberalization episodes in 
Zambia, as well as in Tanzania during 1984-1986 and Ghana in 1967-1972. 
The least significant stimulus for trade liberalization among the case study countries 
is membership in a regional integration arrangement. The trade liberalization scheme 
of ECO WAS remains largely unimplemented. It has, in fact, been virtually ignored 
as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria have concentrated policy and implementation 
attention on the unilateral trade liberalization processes contained in their individual 
structural adjustment programmes. Designed and implemented at national levels, 
these programmes uniformly ignored the regional dimensions of unilateral 
liberalization and paid no attention to the regional integration obligations of particular 
countries. With regard to the PTAICOMESA, it seems clear that pursuit of more 
intense unilateral liberalization at each member country level has overshadowed the 
preferential trade liberalization scheme. In any case, trade liberalization has progressed 
much faster under the unilateral mechanism. 
The most dominant among the stimuli for trade liberalization noted in the case 
studies are linked to conditions imposed by structural adjustment programmes— 
they appear in more than 80% of the liberalization episodes identified by the policy 
accounts. In addition, these trade liberalization episodes have also been the longest 
sustained and the most comprehensive among the liberalization attempts identified 
and analysed in this study. 
Scope and extent of trade liberalization 
In terms of scope, trade liberalization processes covered tariffs and non-tariff measures 
such as quantitative import restrictions and exchange control. 
Tariff structures in all case study countries were substantially compressed by 
reducing the number of tariff categories. Both Tanzania and Zambia brought the 
large number of their tariff categories to 3. Kenya reduced its own from 25 to 6, 
while Côte d'Ivoire moved from 10 to 6. Mauritius reduced the number of its tariff 
categories from 60 to 10. Nigeria's tariff rationalization and restructuring process 
was pursued during 1986/87. South Africa's efforts in this direction started only in 
1995. In virtually all case study countries, the process of compressing tariff structures 
has been gradual, but has generally intensified in each country across trade 
liberalization episodes. As a consequence of this compression process, the rates of 
protection offered to industries in each country is become much less varied, the scope 
for discretionary or ad hoc granting of protection to specific activities is considerably 
reduced, and the transparency of tariff policy is enhanced. 
Tariff structures were not only compressed in all case study countries, tariff rates 
were also substantially reduced. In Mauritius, the maximum tariff rate was reduced 
from 250% to 100%; Tanzania's maximum rate fell from 200% to 50%; Zambia 
reduced its own from 150% to 50%; and the maximum rate in Kenya was reduced 
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from 170% to 40%. Reflecting both tariff structure compression and rate reductions, 
tariff rates in Ghana now range between 100% and 40%, while those in Zimbabwe 
are between 5% and 30%. 
Overall, lower tariff rates have generally not reduced total tariff revenue, as had 
been feared. In most cases, revenues increased as a result of increased compliance by 
taxpayers due to the reduced rates. Moreover, increased imports generated by external 
assistance considerably boosted the tax base in some countries while the steep rise in 
the local value of imports, brought about by large devaluations, generated a similar 
result in other countries. 
Dramatic changes also took place with respect to quantitative restrictions, which 
were eliminated in several cases and either partly or completely converted to tariffs 
in others. Ghana abolished its import licensing system in 1989 and Mauritius 
eliminated its import permits in 1991. Zambia followed suit in 1992, with Kenya and 
Tanzania achieving the same result a year later. By 1990, South Africa had reduced 
its quantitative restrictions by 85%. The remaining countries also significantly reduced 
the proportion of their imports covered by restrictions. The typical mechanism for 
achieving these reductions was a switch from a positive list of permitted imports to a 
small and progressively reducing negative list of prohibited terms. 
The process of reducing quantitative restrictions was helped along by the 
elimination or relaxation of foreign exchange controls in many of the countries. A 
good indicator of this policy change is the sharp decline in the parallel market premium 
for foreign exchange. This decline partly reflects the extent to which the demand for 
foreign exchange (to purchase imports among other uses) is less restricted by controls. 
Exchange rate premiums were virtually eliminated in Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. In these countries, current account transactions are 
free of restrictions and determination of currency rates is market based. 
The effectiveness of the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff measures is broadly 
reflected in the trend of effective rates of protection. Typically, these rates fall with 
trade liberalization. Consistent with this expectation, significant rationalization and 
reduction in effective rates of protection were achieved in nearly all the case study 
countries. Nigeria is the only country in which the general downward trend in effective 
rates of protection was reversed. Starting from a pre-reform level of 33%, Nigeria's 
average effective rate of protection fell to 23% during 1986/87, only to rebound to 
41% in 1991. 
To sum up, it is clear that both tariff and non-tariff measures were significantly 
liberalized in the ten case study countries. The more liberal use of exchange rate 
changes for clearing disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market considerably 
reduced the traditional reliance on trade policy instruments for managing balance- 
of-payments pressures. 
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Credibility and policy reversals 
African trade liberalization attempts suffer from problems of credibility and 
sustainability, which are typically reflected by reversals of trade liberalization 
initiatives—as amply demonstrated by the varying experiences of the ten case study 
countries. Mauritius and Uganda are the only two countries in this sample that did 
not reverse policy. Two countries experienced total policy reversal: Zambia after the 
collapse of its foreign exchange auction in 1986 and Nigeria in 1994. Several countries 
experienced fairly frequent partial policy reversals. Kenya has had at least seven 
liberalization episodes since the early 1 970s, most of which were separated by partial 
reversals. Similarly, Ghana experienced five shifts in trade policy over a period of 
about 15 years. Obviously, frequent and sharp policy changes undermine the credibility 
of subsequent liberalization attempts. 
Mauritius appears to be the most successful of the ten countries in achieving 
credibility. Its first liberalization episode of 1979-1985 focused primarily on 
stabilization and exchange rate adjustment with very little change in direct trade 
policy measures. Comprehensive trade policy adjustment followed during the second 
liberalization episode of 1991-1994. It appears that Mauritius established credibility 
by first demonstrating its determination in the context of a traditional stabilization 
programme that included large devaluations in 1979 (23%) and 1981 (17%). 
By contrast, many trade liberalization attempts were too closely associated with 
the prevailing control regime, which, unlike Mauritius, had not built up a reputation 
for credible reform in other policy areas. 
Most policy reversals revealed in the case studies were triggered by balance-of- 
payments and fiscal incompatibility. The reluctance of governments to refrain from 
using traditional trade policy instruments for addressing incompatibility issues made 
policy reversals virtually unavoidable. Exchange rate adjustments appear crucial in 
this respect. Most of the successful trade liberalization episodes were accompanied 
by large devaluations, while many of the policy reversals can be traced to the reluctance 
to make sufficient and determined use of exchange rate adjustment. It seems to be 
the case that in African economies where there is a historical aversion to changing 
the exchange rate, large devaluations can serve as powerful signals of government's 
determination, which could, in turn, enhance policy credibility. 
The impact of trade liberalization 
The assessment of the impact of trade liberalization was carried out against several 
broad expectations drawn from received wisdom. First, trade liberalization provides 
expanded market opportunities; when coupled with reduced discrimination against 
exports, these allow exploitation of comparative advantage, permit greater capacity 
utilization and enhance exploitation of economies of scale. Second, by reducing anti- 
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export bias trade liberalization stimulates export performance, particularly non-tradi- 
tional exports. Third, increased competition from abroad and enhanced access to 
better technology made possible by trade liberalization induce technological 
innovation and higher productivity. In principle, these impacts of trade liberalization 
are channelled through various resource allocation and supply responses. 
The typical target variables in an evaluation of the impact of trade liberalization 
include changes in output, in various components of trade, in the performance of the 
manufacturing sector and in employment. On this basis, Mauritius stands out as the 
country with the most successful experience with trade liberalization. Its fairly long 
and effective trade liberalization process had significant positive impacts on trade, 
output and employment over the 1979-1990 period. Its import/GDP ratio rose by 
35% and the exportlGDP ratio increased by 46%. Real GDP growth was maintained 
at an average annual rate of 5.6%, while the unemployment rate declined steadily 
from 28% in 1982 to less than 5% in the 1990s. It should be noted, of course, that the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability, other supportive policies and a favourable 
external environment for exports played significant roles in achieving these results. 
In Uganda, the import/GDP ratio increased from 9% to 20% between 1989 and 
1993, but the export/GDP ratio remained roughly constant at 5%. Only massive inflow 
of resources (from official and private sources) made it possible to sustain the trade 
liberalization process. Real GDP grew by an annual average of 6.4% between 1991 
and 1995 while anecdotal evidence suggests positive impacts in terms of employment 
and performance of the manufacturing sector. In spite of the increase in the tax revenue! 
GDP ratio from 7% to 12% between 1991 and 1995, Uganda's liberalization could 
encounter fiscal incompatibility problems in the near future. In the same way, Uganda's 
heavy reliance on massive external financing to maintain the payments compatibility 
of its trade liberalization process should ring alarm bells. 
Zimbabwe's trade liberalization process is more difficult to evaluate in terms of 
its probable impact. This is because the episode is relatively short and largely coincides 
with a sharp negative drought shock that caused a drop of 7.7% in real GDP in 1992 
alone. Overall, however, real GDP growth averaged 3.4% per annum in the early 
1990s, while the manufacturing export sector grew by 19% in real terms over the 
1990/91 - 1994/95 period. It is also estimated that employment increased by 18.4% 
between 1991 and 1995. 
In spite of frequent but partial policy reversals, Kenya's trade liberalization has 
had positive effects on growth in imports, exports, output and employment. The 
import/GDP ratio rose from 26% in 1972 to 36% in 1993, while the exportlGDP 
ratio increased from 26% to 42% over the same period. Real GDP growth averaged 
5% per annum in 1988 and 1989, then recorded less than 5% annual growth rate until 
1995 when it bounced back to 5%. Trade liberalization does not appear to have had 
any marked impact on the manufacturing sector, however. A possible threat to the 
current liberalization process is the reliance on external financing for temporary 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SUMMARY REPORT 31 
balance-of-payments support. This does not appear to have affected the credibility of 
the liberalization process, however. 
In Tanzania, liberalization of the exchange regime rather than trade liberalization 
has had dominant effect on the growth of imports, exports and output. In South Africa, 
trade liberalization prior to 1995 focused largely on export promotion measures to 
eliminate the anti-export bias inherent in the protective trade regime. Import 
liberalization has only just started. Export promotion measures combined with 
exchange rate depreciation helped to produce an average annual export growth rate 
of 7.7% over the 1984-1990 period. 
Ghana has had a fairly long period of trade liberalization experience, but the results 
have been less than impressive. While real GDP growth averaged over 4% per annum 
from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, the response of non-traditional exports was 
modest. Sectoral composition of outputs shifted away from import substituting and 
non-tradeables to tradeable sectors, as anticipated. But unemployment appears to be 
worsening due to the de-industrialization consequences of trade liberalization and 
public sector retrenchment programmes. 
The results of the trade liberalization experiences of Nigeria and Zambia have 
some similarities. In both cases, a dominant mineral sector seems to have deflected 
the impact of trade liberalization, although in both cases the policy was reversed 
before it could have any real impact. In any case, trade liberalization measures probably 
had only a marginal effect on the performance of the Zambian economy. During the 
decade from 1983, the import/GDP ratio fell from 52% to 33%, while the export! 
GDP ratio declined from 29% to 20%. In the case of Nigeria, trade liberalization had 
no significant effect on output, employment or imports. 
A few summarizing generalizations can be made on the basis of the trade 
liberalization experiences of this set of countries. First, there was a shift of resources 
away from import-substituting and non-tradeable sectors to the tradeables. As a result, 
exports responded positively, although modestly, and trade shares generally increased. 
Second, some amount of de-industrialization occurred in some countries. Trade 
liberalization unleashed competitive pressure that many previously sheltered and 
inefficient industrial firms have been unable to cope with, but new export-oriented 
activities have not bloomed sufficiently to take up the slack. Finally, continued 
credibility of some of the trade liberalization processes faces serious challenge as 
their heavy reliance on external financing may not be sustainable. 
6. Opening up and linking Africa together 
African regional integration schemes have typically been based on trade creation 
and trade expansion objectives, even though they have also been driven by other 
non-economic concerns. This primary trade policy focus of regional integration 
schemes suggests that regional integration and trade liberalization processes could 
be closely associated. This AERC collaborative project took off from this premise. 
In general, trade liberalization can be viewed as one of the means through which 
the primary objective of regional integration schemes, i.e., trade expansion, can be 
achieved; regional integration may be thought of as one of the mechanisms for 
implementing a regionally coordinated trade liberalization programme. This section 
addresses both of these perspectives. 
Opening up Africa through trade liberalization 
Mainstream literature on trade and development suggests that trade liberalization 
that produces a neutral or outward oriented trade regime confers certain productivity- 
enhancing and growth-promoting features on the liberalized economy. Prominent 
among these are improvement in the efficiency with which resources are allocated, 
increase in competition and product specialization, enhanced ability of the economy 
to attract foreign investment, and creation of a favourable environment for technology 
transfer. Within an open or outward oriented trade regime, technology can be 
transferred through several distinct mechanisms, for example, as an integral part of 
direct foreign investment. The import of capital goods that embody current technol- 
ogy constitutes another transfer route. In addition, increased competition that induces 
exporting firms to operate at or close to the frontiers of technological development 
provides another technology transfer mechanism. 
Insights derived from endogenous growth models in which trade plays a role in 
promoting growth through its function as a mechanism for diffusing technological 
innovation are broadly consistent with the above. The focus here, however, is on a 
specific aspect of the mechanism by which the growth promoters are imported. This 
perspective is particularly relevant for Africa where it would be reasonable to associate 
the growth-promoting effect of expanding trade primarily with the productivity- 
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enhancing characteristics of technology embodied in, and the increased capacity 
utilization permitted by, increased imports of capital and intermediate inputs. 
It is clear that both perspectives recognize the significant role of exports in the 
process. This significance derives not only from the reality that exports can be an 
important vehicle for technology transfer in their own right, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, they are the primary source for financing the indispensable 
bottleneck-breaking and technology-bearing imports. 
The evolution of trade regimes of many African countries in the 1 960s and 1 970s 
was largely ad hoc, reflecting attempts to use one instrument (i.e., trade policy) to 
achieve several (sometimes conflicting) objectives. In addition to their use for 
generating fiscal revenue and confronting balance-of-payments problems, import 
control measures were often used as instruments of industrial policy. In general, 
however, the experience of these countries shows that budgetary needs and balance- 
of-payments concerns had a much stronger impact on the evolution and structure of 
their trade regimes than did the desire to protect local industry. This experience appears 
to be broadly consistent with basic principles that suggest the revenue-raising role of 
import tariffs would dominate industrial protection as long as foreign exchange alloca- 
tion is the binding constraint on imports. Only with foreign exchange liberalization 
does the tariff structure become the principal source of protection. 
The African trade policy reforms that began in the mid 1980s and are, in many 
countries, still gcing on, achieved some significant results. In general, these reforms 
typically increased the relative price of exportables compared to non-tradeables; they 
also reduced, to some extent, the anti-export bias within the tradeables sector. Much 
still remains to be done, however, especially in terms of rationalizing the trade regime. 
Recent liberalization efforts have generally concentrated on the import side and 
have, to that extent, not paid sufficient attention to the elimination of the anti-export 
bias inherent in the trade regime. In particular, little progress has been made in 
establishing efficient mechanisms for giving exporters access to inputs at interna- 
tionally competitive prices. 
Future trade policy initiatives in Africa should obviously derive from the region's 
long-term development strategy, which, in consonance with experience in other 
regions, should stress broad outward orientation. An outward oriented development 
strategy presumes that aggregate economic growth will be export-led in an 
environment in which macroeconomic balance and stability are maintained. In the 
peculiar circumstances of Africa, with its rudimentary industrial sectors, several impor- 
tant elements of an outward oriented development strategy should be integrated. 
First, the existing manufacturing sector needs to be restructured since its current 
structure and efficiency levels (built up under more interventionist trade and exchange 
rate regimes) are ill-suited to exporting. Second, the existing incentive regime should 
be altered to provide exporters with access to inputs at internationally competitive 
prices, net of tariffs and indirect taxes. Third, appropriate proactive measures should 
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be used to assist manufacturers and exporters to cope with the rigorous production 
and learning-by-doing requirements of international markets and the difficulties of 
gaining access to the information and technology necessary for effective competition 
in those markets. 
Industrialization is clearly an important component of sustainable overall economic 
development; and the experience of other rapidly developing countries and regions 
suggests that the export of manufactured goods is one of the key elements of the 
dynamism and impressive economic growth performance of these countries and 
regions. Similarly, African countries should be justifiably concerned about the survival 
and future development of an efficient and export-oriented manufacturing sector as 
an important component of their long-term development. This concern translates, in 
trade policy discussions, into the idea that some degree of protection is necessary as 
part of the proactive measures aimed at encouraging the expansion of the region's 
manufacturing sector. In other words, there exists a case for some non-zero import 
tariff levels and a non-uniform import tariff structure in African countries not just for 
revenue-raising purposes but more explicitly to protect local manufacturing activities 
from foreign competition. 
At the same time, however, considerations of allocative efficiency suggest several 
qualifications. First, the level of import protection should be moderate (perhaps no 
more than 25%) to limit the relative price distortions they can create and hence the 
damage they can do to the economy. Second, import protection should be strictly 
limited, time bound and related to some clearly understood and measurable 
performance standard. Third, the tariff structure should be fairly simple, reflecting a 
limited number of tariff rates to ensure greater transparency. 
As indicated earlier, in relation to the export sector, trade liberalization should 
include policy changes that produce an outward oriented trade regime that explicitly 
favours and actively promotes exports. This reflects the reality, based on accumulated 
experience of other developing regions, that good export performance is not just a 
desirable goal in its own right but is also a critical means to other important ends, i.e., 
deeper import liberalization and more robust overall economic growth. Exports are, 
essentially, a means of acquiring the foreign exchange with which to purchase the 
increased imports made available through trade liberalization. Therefore, good export 
performance plays a pivotal role in sustaining import liberalization to the extent that 
increased flow of foreign exchange resulting from expanded exports helps to reduce 
the need for import compression. 
The elimination of disincentives against exporters including regulatory require- 
ments is generally not likely to pose serious fiscal problems in the trade liberalization 
process. Therefore, there is a strong case for focusing immediate policy attention on 
encouraging exports, while leaving major import liberalization attempts until later, 
when sufficient export response can provide the financing for further import 
liberalization. In other words, whenever export performance can be more readily 
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induced through specific export promotion measures, it would be reasonable to 
implement them before deeper import liberalization is attempted. A successful and 
sustainable import liberalization programme requires successful exports. 
The speed at which the rationalization of the tariff structure and the lowering of 
tariff rates should be achieved would obviously depend on each country's initial 
conditions, the response of its export sector and its access to external financing. 
Rapid and deep trade liberalizations may generate unsustainable import surges. Such 
sharp import increases can, of course, be financed by either a comfortable and steady 
flow of foreign exchange earnings and stock of reserves or through an adequate and 
sustained level of foreign assistance. Countries that cannot count on an assured, 
adequate and sustainable flow of import financing must necessarily be more 
circumspect with regard to both the speed of tariff reduction and the ultimate target 
tariff range envisaged in their trade liberalization programmes. 
Prior achievement and continuous maintenance of macroeconomic balance and 
stability are essential for reaping the benefits of import liberalization. Similarly, a 
more flexible and responsive exchange rate policy backed with adequate financing is 
necessary if generalized import liberalization is to be consistent with the maintenance 
of balance of payments stability. When these pre-requisites have been satisfied, 
standard trade policy instruments can be released from inappropriate revenue-raising 
and balance of payments objectives so that they can focus explicitly on the more 
legitimate role of enhancing efficiency of resource allocation and promoting long- 
term development via industrialization, export expansion and diversification. 
The context in which trade liberalization programmes are implemented has 
significant implications for their sustainability and success. Several key features 
characterize most of the recent trade liberalization episodes in Africa in this respect. 
First, these were unilateral trade liberalization attempts that focused primarily on 
imports. Second, they were designed and implemented as integral parts of structural 
adjustment reform packages. Third, they were induced by external financing. Fourth, 
they ignored regional spillovers and adverse consequences of lack of regional 
coordination and harmonization. Many of the aid-induced trade liberalization attempts 
have been incompatible with underlying fiscal and balance-of-payments realities in 
the absence of external financing. 
The credibility of many trade liberalization episodes has been suspect, while quite 
a few have suffered reversals. It seems that their aid-induced nature and their inherent 
incompatibility with basic economic reality in the absence of assured long-term 
external financing gave private economic agents sufficient reason to doubt their 
credibility and sustainability, which, in turn, led to ineffective and anaemic response. 
While unilateral and aid-induced trade liberalization may be inherently prone to 
credibility and sustainability problems, it may well be that these problems can be 
ameliorated if trade liberalization attempts are designed and implemented in the 
context of some regional or multilateral agreements or, in the case of unilateral efforts, 
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if the results are registered with and embedded in an international agreement. The 
former case has several desirable features. For one, peer pressure and reciprocity 
may enable each country to take liberalized policy actions that they would otherwise 
hesitate to take unilaterally. Moreover, such policy measures become less susceptible 
to pressures from local anti-reform interest groups in each country. The fear of group 
penalty helps all the participating countries lock in the achievements of liberalization 
by rendering each country's policy reform largely irreversible. In this sense, credibility 
of trade liberalization is invariably enhanced in the context of the "reciprocal-threat" 
arrangement in which the certain reactions of partners make unilateral policy reversal 
too costly to contemplate. 
Based on the observations that there has been little or no trade liberalization in 
Africa implemented in the context of regional integration schemes with strong and 
effective "reciprocal-threat" features, and that donor-supported unilateral trade 
liberalization attempts often lack credibility and are highly susceptible to reversal, a 
couple of options are worth exploring in the future. Clearly, the credibility of African 
trade liberalization attempts would be enhanced if the resulting tariff ceilings were 
"bound" under the provisions of the GATTIWTO agreements. This would be the 
easier option to implement since virtually all African countries are already (or can 
become) parties to these agreements. A second option would be for future African 
trade liberalization measures to be implemented, not unilaterally as hitherto, but in 
the context of an effective North-South regional integration arrangement with strong 
built-in "reciprocal-threat" features that could serve as sufficient deterrent to policy 
reversal. Since such an arrangement does not yet exist and its costs and benefits to all 
potential participants are currently unknown, it remains to be seen whether it would 
in fact dominate the former as a viable policy option. 
Linking Africa together via regional integration 
The need to link African countries together is, to many in Africa, virtually self-evident. 
The small size of the typical African economy and the resultant constraints on rapid 
economic development, the growth-retarding nature of the hub-and-spoke production 
and trade pattern inherited from Africa's colonial past, and the desire to channel the 
neighbourhood effects and regional spill-overs into more positive growth-enhancing 
directions constitute rational and basically economic reasons for seeking closer 
cooperation among African countries. This search is also motivated by non-economic 
reasons. Pan-Africanism, as an expression of continental identity, unity and coherence, 
constitutes the essentially political bedrock of regional integration in Africa. This 
political inspiration seeks to create a strong African bloc that could be used effectively 
in the international political arena, for dealing with security concerns and for use as 
a vehicle for the resolution of regional conflicts in Africa. 
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The combination of economic and political rationale for the existence of various 
regional integration schemes in Africa may provide part of the explanation for why 
the existing regional integration arrangements have failed to fulfill the high 
expectations attached to them as vehicles for improving the economic performance 
and welfare of Africa. In the ultimate, of course, and as the treaties and protocols of 
most of the African regional integration schemes clearly demonstrate, regional 
integration remains essentially an exercise in economic relations between countries. 
Hence, any regional integration scheme must, in the end, be justified in economic 
terms. 
The basic economic rationale and goal of African regional integration can be 
broadly described as follows. Given the small size of the economies, pulling them 
together can be a useful means of first increasing intra-regional trade and then 
promoting economic development through industrial growth. In this framework, trade 
expansion occurs largely through import substitution within the regional market. In 
essence, therefore, each regional integration scheme could be visualized, in its initial 
phase, as an inward-looking instrument of industrialization and economic growth. 
Subsequently, however, if the scheme achieved reasonable success in this initial phase, 
it could shed its inward-looking characteristics and become an instrument for 
projecting the integrated region more positively into the world market. The infant 
industries that develop under the regional import substitution framework could first 
learn to export within the protected regional market, but eventually would become 
efficient enough and strong enough to face world competition without further 
protection. 
In Africa, this model of regional integration has not lived up to expectations for a 
number of reasons. First, the individual African economies are so small that even 
when combined in the various regional integration schemes that have dotted the 
African landscape over the last 30 years or so, the larger regional markets have still 
been quite small by international standards and hence not large enough to achieve 
high levels of industrial growth and efficiency. Secondly, the structure and efficiency 
levels of industries that grow within these protected regional markets are not generally 
sufficient to enable them to compete effectively in the world market. Third, these 
expectations have turned out to be largely hypothetical, in any case, since the creation 
of integrated regional markets has remained an elusive and distant goal, partly because 
the regional integration model is probably inappropriate and, perhaps more 
significantly, because the various integration schemes have not been seriously 
implemented. 
Despite the widely documented failures of African regional integration schemes 
in the past and clear indications of current uncertainties, the idea of regional integration 
continues to be popular, while enthusiasm for it is high and actually appears to be 
rising. Regionalism is an ideal that is apparently here to stay. Many still believe that 
the establishment of larger political and economic units in Africa would enhance the 
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process of development. These larger units may not necessarily be concerned primarily 
with preferential trade arrangements but more broadly with cooperation on many 
economic issues. In effect, a constructive approach in charting a path into the future 
would be to devise suitable integration mechanisms that would exploit the apparent 
commitment to the ideal of closer collaboration in Africa and, at the same time, 
ensure that the resulting regional integration arrangements contain strong outward 
oriented features. 
One such mechanism would pull back somewhat from the rather high level of 
economic integration envisaged in the treaties and protocols of the existing regional 
integration arrangements, including the proposed African Economic Community. 
Under this mechanism, current integration schemes would give way to functional 
and thematic regional cooperation arrangements between various countries to 
implement joint infrastructure projects in such areas as transport and communication, 
development and management of water resources, provision of educational and 
research facilities, and the establishment of codes on cross-border investment and 
the movement of persons. It is suggested that this functional and thematic form of 
regional cooperation has several desirable features. 
First, it would facilitate the build-up of critical infrastructures requiring high-cost 
and indivisible investment, which should generate lower unit costs when provided 
on a regional rather than national scale. Second, this form of regional cooperation 
would be more flexible and pragmatic in circumventing problems posed by 
nationalism and equity regarding the distribution of costs and benefits of integration. 
Third, it is, in any case, better suited to dealing with the range of physical and technical 
barriers to intra-regional trade that may lie outside the direct purview of trade policy. 
Fourth, experience gained in this process as well as the infrastructure developed 
would lay the foundation for subsequent deeper economic integration and the 
acceptance of the need to transfer some aspects of national-level sovereignty demanded 
by closer integration. 
This "pull back" approach is probably too defeatist, given the energy and resources 
that have already gone into designing and implementing regional integration schemes 
in Africa. A more forward looking approach would perhaps be more acceptable. 
Such an approach would have to start with the recognition that the "old style" import 
substitution industrialization model has fallen out of favour and that regionalism 
based explicitly on outward orientation would be more consistent with the emerging 
policy environment in Africa. This starting point would be without prejudice to the 
desire to provide domestic industries an opportunity to learn to cope with competition 
in the larger regional market before being exposed to the more intense competitive 
pressures in the world marketplace. But it would view the larger regional market 
primarily as an entry point into and the conduit through which the international market 
would eventually be accessed. 
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The characteristics of regionalism that would capture the basic features articulated 
above imply that the existing African regional integration schemes should be converted 
from free trade arrangements into open-ended customs unions. This regional 
integration model requires that a common external tariff be established and that all 
national level tariffs come down to the lowest level existing in the union when it is 
established. The open-ended customs union model has several desirable features. 
First, the effectiveness of lobbies against liberalization is much more diluted since 
region-wide lobbying is necessary to block reform, whereas, in a free trade area, 
tariffs are responsive to national level interest groups. 
Second, the open-ended feature of this model facilitates the entry of new members 
as long as they are prepared to accept the rules and responsibilities of the union. 
Third, the common external tariff removes the need for rules of origin which often 
cause conflict and perpetuate protection in schemes based on the free-trade-area model. 
Fourth, the common external tariff provides the revenue base for an appropriate 
compensation arrangement in the union; this is an in-built revenue source that is 
absent in free trade areas and implies that compensation funds must be generated 
through direct contribution from members. 
African regional integration schemes have the potential to contribute to Africa's 
process of economic development. They suffered in the past, and are probably doing 
so currently, from design faults and implementation problems. Their potential will 
not be realized until both of these problem areas are appropriately addressed. 
7. Linking Africa with the world 
Regardless of their specific trade policy stance, the economies of African countries 
have traditionally been heavily influenced by developments in the world economy as 
these are mediated through changes in commodity prices, changes in the prices of 
African imports, flows of foreign assistance and direct foreign investment, and, more 
recently, the external debt overhang. Recent trade liberalization and other policy 
reforms in Africa could substantially propel Africa into a closer embrace with the 
world economy. 
This section focuses on some of the key features that would be involved in the 
process of linking Africa with the world. It also considers the role of trade liberalization 
in the linking process and concludes with a discussion of some of the mechanisms 
for endowing African trade liberalization attempts with greater credibility and 
sustainability that also imply and are consistent with greater integration of Africa 
into the global marketplace. 
African trade liberalization in the context of globalization 
The ongoing trade liberalization and related economic policy reforms in Africa can, 
in some sense, be seen as part of a more general phenomenon among developing 
countries world-wide. These policy reforms feed, in turn, into an increasing 
globalization that further links together world economies, both developed and 
developing. In broad terms, globalization offers important opportunities for 
accelerating economic growth all over the world. Hence, it is suggested that countries 
and regions of the world that are unable or unwilling to integrate themselves into this 
emerging mainstream of the global economy might not benefit from the growth- 
enhancing features of globalization. 
The literature suggests that deeper integration into the world economy matters 
because it is associated with growth in several ways. First, integration tends to promote 
higher growth through such channels as improved resource allocation, greater 
competition, technology transfer and learning, and improved access to foreign capital. 
Second, trade and investment tend to increase more rapidly in countries that have 
opened themselves up to the world economy than in those that have not. Third, there 
is a reverse flow; growth itself tends to promote integration. Fast-growing countries 
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attract more foreign direct investment and secure better and cheaper access to the 
world's financial markets, and imports rise faster. 
The experience of many developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s appears 
to be broadly consistent with these expectations. It can be shown, in particular, that 
during this period, the more open economies grew faster than the closed ones, while 
structural change corresponding to a shift in reliance from primary production to 
manufacturing occurred faster in open economies than in the relatively more closed 
ones. In the aggregate, between 1960 and 1990, the volume of world merchandise 
trade increased more than five-fold, a growth rate that substantially exceeded the 
trebling of world merchandise output over the same period. This sharp difference in 
growth rates reflected growing openness and interdependence of national economies. 
African countries are more weakly integrated into the global economy than are 
countries in other regions of the developing world. For instance, African countries 
did not participate in the virtually universal trend of increasing trade share over this 
period; in Africa these shares were lower in 1990 than they were in 1960. The decline 
in African trade ratios over this period was also accompanied by extremely low ratios 
of foreign direct investment to GDP and virtual exclusion of African countries from 
the global financial markets. This reality of the African experience may suggest that 
both inadequate integration into the world economy and consequent lack of growth 
have led to the region's marginalization in the world goods and capital markets. 
Globalization is clearly not free of problems. It can be linked to greater vulnerability 
of individual countries to external shocks, which, in turn, tends to negatively affect 
economic performance. It lacks an effective overall macroeconomic manager, with 
the rules and institutional arrangements that govern and constrain economic behaviour 
in the social interest in the typical nation-state remaining largely absent at the global 
level. In addition, while the essentially free global market economy can generate 
large inequalities in income distribution between regions, countries and even 
individuals, it lacks the necessary equity-oriented arrangements for easing these 
inequalities. It can thus can generate potentially severe and world-wide 
macroeconomic turbulence. 
As in other areas of policy making, therefore, greater integration into the global 
economy is associated with benefits and costs. Globalization does not necessarily 
offer the same potential opportunities to all countries and the costs may also be 
differentiated. The terms and conditions under which Africa links itself to the world 
through trade liberalization and associated policy reforms and in the context of the 
general trend towards increasing globalization should reflect choices that explicitly 
recognize the costs and benefits of globalization and assign an important role to risk 
aversion. More specifically, Africa's long-term development strategy would probably 
involve the rise of selective and differential incentives and disincentives in guiding a 
broad range of economic activities. At the same time, the proactive measures necessary 
for local capacity building may neither permit the establishment of totally level 
"playing fields" in certain policy areas nor be consistent with total harmonization of 
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Africa's domestic policies with international standards over which the region may 
have little influence. 
External agencies of restraint and African trade 
liberalization 
Many African trade liberalization attempts have suffered from lack of credibility and 
policy reversals. One explanation for this appears to be lack of effective restraints on 
African governments, which gives room for capricious and frequent changes in trade 
policy. Thus, in the absence of an effective mechanism for locking in reform, reversal 
of trade liberalization has become a serious problem in Africa. 
Credibility and sustainability are critically important characteristics of effective 
trade liberalization. If key economic actors do not believe that new incentive structures 
created by a trade liberalization episode will be sustained, they will not respond in 
the expected development-oriented manner and the effects of the reform will be 
blunted or even negated. 
The failure of private investment to recover in Africa in spite of considerable 
policy reform efforts may be important evidence that lack of credibility of these 
policy reform efforts has been costly. The enormous increase in foreign direct and 
portfolio investment in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s has almost 
completely by-passed Africa. Domestic investment has not filled the gap. The 
combined result of these trends is the low level of private investment, which probably 
constitutes the most serious constraint to economic recovery and growth in Africa. 
Because lack of credibility and sustainability of trade liberalization negatively 
affect its effectiveness, it is important to establish appropriate mechanisms for locking 
in policy reform through effective agencies that can restrain African governments. 
These governments are not in a position to create viable, effective domestic agencies 
of restraint, given the fragile nature and absence of widespread confidence in the 
rule of law in many African countries. 
The inability to establish viable domestic agencies of restraint by individual African 
countries is not necessarily unique. Many countries outside Africa, both developing 
and developed, have found external commitments useful as something policy makers 
can hide behind when attempting to ward off local interest groups seeking to curtail 
reform. 
Typically, the need for external restraint has been met by the creation of inter- 
governmental institutions that work essentially by means of reciprocal threats. In 
other words, these agencies provide the mechanism by which a government could 
credibly lock in the achievements of its trade liberalization efforts, with enforcement 
supplied by the certainty of punishment by the other partners to the agreement. In 
general, these institutions are not only reciprocal, they also have penalties at their 
disposal sufficient to deter unacceptable behaviour by any member and an incentive 
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to invoke these penalties. Their reciprocal nature requires that the governments that 
choose to be bound by them also participate in the design of the rules and in the 
supply of enforcement. Reciprocity and full participation by individual members 
ensure that the agency will not abuse its power to extract behaviour the participating 
governments do not voluntarily choose. 
African countries have, in principle, several options to choose from in selecting 
an external agency of restraint to assist in enhancing the credibility of their trade 
liberalization efforts. For instance, each country could use the regional integration 
scheme to which it belongs as an agency of restraint. However, it appears unlikely 
that an African regional integration scheme can serve as an effective agency of 
restraint. The reality of the existing schemes is that the potential penalties they can 
impose for breaking an agreement are quite small. In any case, they have not demon- 
strated a clear ability and willingness to impose significant penalties on erring 
members. 
A more viable option for African countries would be to use the GATT/WTO as an 
agency of restraint. This is, in fact, the premier institution at the global level that 
monitors and restrains the behaviour of contracting parties or member countries in 
the trade policy arena. Under the GATTIWTO framework, tariff bindings lock in 
progress on the domestic front and are useful in warding off local lobbies seeking 
further protection. These internationally registered bindings then become an important 
mechanism of importing credibility for a trade reform programme. Although most 
African countries subscribe to GATT/WTO and could use it as an agency of restraint 
in support of their trade liberalization efforts, they have not in fact done so. African 
countries have historically had limited participation in GATTIWTO, including the 
recently completed Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations. 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, less than half of the African members had lodged 
their tariff schedules with the GATT. In the Round itself, South Africa was the only 
sub-Saharan African country to make an offer of tariff reduction. All other countries 
offered average tariff bindings that were several multiples of their existing applied 
rates, while they made little effort to extend the coverage of their tariff bindings 
beyond 2% of their tariff lines. They have thus retained considerable discretion for 
making tariff changes. From this perspective, the opportunity offered by the Uruguay 
Round for African countries to shore up the credibility of their trade reform efforts 
was not taken up. The opportunity continues to exist, however, and is well worth 
pursuing in the context of more active African participation in GATTIWTO. 
A third option in the search for an external agency of restraint for Africa is to have 
a series of African customs unions linked to the European Union in fully reciprocal 
free trade arrangements that would essentially replicate many of the key features of 
NAFTA. This scheme could provide a powerful lock-in mechanism and underpin the 
credibility of African trade reform since treaty commitments with this large and rich 
northern partner would be too costly to be repudiated by any African country. The 
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guarantee of access to this large market could also assist in attracting inward direct 
foreign investment. 
This proposal raises several issues that need to be carefully examined before its 
viability can be established. First, it is not clear what the interest of the EU would be 
in such an arrangement. Second, many in Africa might regard the arrangement as a 
recolonization of Africa. Third, the relative costs and benefits of the arrangement 
should be comprehensively analysed. It is not immediately obvious that it would not 
impose inordinately high costs or that its potential benefits are not being overstated. 
The generalization from a relationship based on trade policy to the surveillance of a 
whole range of economic and sociopolitical policies, which this arrangement may 
encourage, could lead to the establishment of "harmonized" rules and standards that 
may be inappropriate for particular African country circumstances. 
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